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Abstract 
 
To investigate the size and the timing of the direct impact of participatory arrangements on 
business performance, we assemble and analyze extraordinary daily data-- for rejection, 
production and downtime rates for all operators in a single plant during a 35 month period, more 
than 77,000 observations. Consistent with core hypotheses that employee involvement enhances 
productivity and quality through mechanisms including employees becoming better motivated, 
more informed and paying greater attention to product details, we find that membership in 
offline teams: (i) initially enhances individual productivity by about 3%; (ii) and lowers rejection 
rates by about 27%. We also find that: (iii) these improvements are dissipated, typically at 10 to 
16% per 100 days in a team; (iv) while initially teams lead to more downtime, these costs 
diminish over time; (v) the performance-enhancing effects of team membership are generally 
greater and more long-lasting for team members who are solicited by management; (vi) similar 
relationships exist for more educated team members. These findings square with diverse 
hypotheses concerning predicted gains from complementarities in organizational design, the 
benefits that flow from management solicitation and enhanced education, but are inconsistent 
with hypotheses based on Hawthorne effects. 
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The Impact of Teams on Output, Quality and Downtime: 
An Empirical Analysis Using Individual Panel Data 
I. Introduction 
In many areas of economics the gains from advances in econometric techniques and 
theory have been muted because of limited data (Griliches, 1994:2). This proposition applies 
especially forcefully in the literature concerning the nature and effects of human resource 
policies. While much theoretical work points to the existence of powerful links between business 
performance and workplace innovations, especially high performance workplace practices 
(HPWPs) such as employee involvement and incentive pay, often theorists disagree over the 
size, direction and nature of such links.1 Moreover, in attempting to assess recent theoretical 
advances in this area, most empirical work necessarily has used data from national surveys of 
firms or establishments from diverse industries (e.g. on firm-level outcomes see Craig and 
Pencavel, 1995; Appelbaum and Batt, 1994; Jones and Kato, 1995; Freeman, Kleiner and 
Ostroff, 2000.)2  Unfortunately, while such studies are very valuable, potentially national cross-
industry studies have significant limitations including measurement problems, endogeneity, and 
omitted variables (e.g. Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw, 2004).  
One important response to these difficulties of national cross-industry studies has been 
“insider econometric studies” in which researchers conduct detailed qualitative field research at 
establishments within a narrowly defined industry and develop detailed understanding of the 
actual production process and the use of HPWPs.  Researchers then obtain access to unique 
internal and confidential data at the level of establishments or branches (e.g., physical 
                                                 
1Compare, for example, Alchian and Demsetz (1972), with Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1995. See 
also for example Kandel and Lazear (1992), Gibbons (1997) and Prendergast (1999) who provide 
insightful surveys of the theoretical literature. 
2On establishment-level outcomes see for example Black and Lynch (2001) and Cappelli and 
Neumark (2001).  Most international studies are also of this type.  For instance, see Kato and Morishima 
(2002) for Japan; Addison and Belfield (2000), Freeman and Conyon (2001), DeVaro (2004) for the 
U.K.; Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) for France; Eriksson (2003) for Denmark; Bayo-Moriones, Galilea-
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productivity, rejection rate and downtime at the establishment-level) and estimate the impact on 
establishment performance of HPWPs (e.g., Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi, 1997).3    
Another important development is empirical work by economists that uses data on 
individual workers employed by a single firm (e.g. Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan, 2003; 
Lazear, 2000).4  These “econometric case studies” allow one to incorporate more detailed 
information on key features of the organization of production than is possible using traditional 
data for a large number of firms.  Thus they go deep within the “black-box” of the firm and 
enable one to obtain more precise estimates of the effects of HPWPs on firms and employees and 
the channels through which these practices operate. However, since such data are notoriously 
difficult to obtain there have only been a handful of such “insider econometric” studies. It is to 
this latter class of work that this paper makes several contributions. 
Specifically, we provide the first rigorous empirical analysis of the economic effects of 
employee involvement in teams in a plant that had only recently introduced offline teams and 
where not all workers were team members. We make use of a unique data set that has been 
constructed for this case during a period of thirty-five months. Our data are for all operators in 
that plant during that period and include all workers who remain in the plant as well as workers 
who leave the firm. For these operators we have daily observations for key measures of 
individual performance, specifically measures of individual physical production and rejection 
rates for individual worker output. Also we are able to use data on individual rates of downtime. 
These data enable us to meet the demanding data requirements that are necessitated by 
                                                                                                                                                             
Salvatierra, Merino-Díaz de Cerio ((2003) for Spain; Leoni, et al. (2003) for Italy; and Zwick (2004) for 
Germany. 
3 See also MacDuffie (1995), Dunlop and Weil (1996), Kelley (1996), Huselid and Becker 
(1996), Helper (1998),  Bartel (2004), and Appelbaum et al. (2000).  Ichniowski, et al. (1996) provide a 
succinct discussion on the key methodological issues encountered by empirical studies. 
4 Pioneering works using internal personnel data in economic research include Medoff and 
Abraham (1980), and Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b).  
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institutionally informed econometric case studies.5  These extraordinary data enable us to 
provide rigorous empirical tests of diverse hypotheses including the direct impact of membership 
in offline teams on production and quality. 
 Our interest in teams in part reflects the changing nature of workplaces during the last 
thirty years or so. A notable feature is the emergence of HPWPs including mechanisms that 
provide for employee involvement (e.g. teams, quality circles, total quality management, and 
information sharing) and incentive pay (e.g. profit sharing and employee stock ownership).6  
Particular attention has been paid to the use of various kinds of teams. While estimates of the 
incidence of teams vary, there is agreement that there has been a dramatic increase in the use of 
employee involvement through mechanisms including teams in US industry. The structure of the 
paper is as follows. 
In the next section we briefly provide a conceptual review and develop the six hypotheses 
we test in our empirical work. This is followed by a review of relevant econometric case study 
evidence. To provide adequate institutional context for our statistical analysis, we then provide a 
detailed discussion of key institutional features for our case. We also discuss our data and 
provide descriptive statistics for key variables. The main parts of our paper are contained in the 
penultimate section where we present our empirical strategy and findings.  
A key finding is that membership in offline teams results in modest but nevertheless 
significant enhanced individual rates of output. More dramatic effects are found for product 
quality as participation in offline teams leads to large falls in rejection rates. Evidence is also 
found that the introduction of teams is initially accompanied by significant costs in the form of 
increased rates of downtime, though these costs dissipate over time. All of our findings are 
                                                 
 5 For a recent review of such studies see Jones, Kalmi and Kauhanen (2006). 
6 For estimates of the incidence of teams in the U.S., based on establishment-level surveys, see 
for example Osterman (1994), and Black and Lynch (2004).  For estimates of the team incidence based on 
 4
insensitive to including/excluding operators who left during the study period. Consistent with 
theorists who stress the benefits of complementarities in organizational design, we find that the 
impact of enhanced employee involvement through teams alone is not sustained at initial levels. 
Our data also enable us to investigate issues concerning the team member selection 
process and the possible complementary role of education in team effects. When we examine 
team effects separately for those solicited by management and those who volunteered to become 
team members without management solicitation, we find that the performance-enhancing effects 
of team membership tend to be greater and more long-lasting for solicited team members and 
that the cost (or increased downtime) of team membership is smaller and diminishes more 
quickly for solicited team members. The finding is consistent with our conjectures: (i) that 
management will have a better sense of those individuals who are both likely to be better fits as  
team members and also more likely to continue to be motivated and to learn skills in teams; (ii) 
that some of those employees who volunteer to become team members without management 
solicitation may be behaving opportunistically; and (iii) that management solicitation serves as a 
credible signal to the solicited workers that they are indeed in the promotion tournament for line 
supervisors. Turning to education, when we study whether the performance effects of team 
membership differ between those with and without education beyond high school, we find that 
the performance-enhancing effects of teams (especially quality improvement) are generally 
greater and more long-lasting for team members with education beyond high school. This 
evidence suggests a complementarity between teams and formal education. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
firm-level surveys in the U.S., see for example Freeman, Kleiner and Ostroff (2000).  For estimates based 
on worker surveys in the U.S., see for example Freeman and Rogers (1999).  
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II. Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses  
 To develop our two core hypotheses on the expected association between employee 
involvement and ultimately firm performance, we briefly review key aspects of the theoretical 
debate especially literature that focuses on employee participation via membership in teams. 
Since ours is not a theoretical contribution and good reviews of this literature already exist,7 here 
we merely highlight themes in the debates.  First, however, we note that the theoretical literature 
sometimes does not clearly recognize that “teams” may assume various organizational forms. 
For the most part, theorists implicitly appear to assume that teams are on-line (such as “cells” in 
many US companies) and not of an off-line character (such as, in many U.S. firms, cross-
functional project teams, task forces, committees and problem solving groups or shop floor 
committees and joint labor-management committees in Japan or works councils in Germany.)8  
Our central concern is with the direct impact of employee involvement through teams on 
business performance. Theorists disagree both as to the expected impact of teams on individual, 
group and ultimately firm performance as well as concerning the main drivers in these 
relationships. For those who see teams as having largely beneficial effects for firms (and 
possibly workers), it is often argued that teams are required because of other developments, 
notably the remarkable changes in information and communication technologies and the 
intensification of competition in product markets that increasingly are globalized. These changes 
mean that firms are better able to manage inventory and, in turn, suggest that there will be bigger 
payoffs to complementary changes in work organization and quality practices. In particular it is 
expected that there will be benefits to firms to encourage and reward programs that facilitate 
more horizontal co-ordination (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995) among workers and produce 
                                                 
7 See for example Gibbons (1997), Gibbons and Waldman (1999), and Prendergast (1999). 
8 For discussions of various participatory arrangements in Japan see Kato (2003).   
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improved communications among workers so that they can better solve problems.9 In this view, 
as the extent of horizontal co-ordination grows, this produces a need for structural changes 
within organizations that provide even greater opportunities for enhanced participation, such as 
teams and financial incentive systems that better link enterprise performance with the 
involvement of broader groups of workers than just top managers. 
 One broad group of beneficial outcomes that such arrangements are expected to produce 
are the direct impact of teams resulting from improved motivation and enhanced discretionary 
effort by team members and enhanced skill and knowledge of team members.  By participating 
in teams, team members suffer less from information asymmetry, and develop more trust in 
management, stronger commitment to the organization and their goals are more aligned with the 
firm’s.  The result is improved motivation and enhanced discretionary effort among team 
members.  Moreover, team members engage in knowledge sharing among themselves, enhance 
their human capital and thus the performance of team members improves.   
Furthermore, we expect improved performance as a result of teams to be felt more 
strongly in product quality than in productivity.10  The introduction of participatory arrangements 
in general and offline teams in particular is expected to change employee attitudes so that team 
members better understand the crucial importance of quality for organizational success. Others 
argue that the introduction of or membership in teams will foster and enhance trust which has 
been identified as a key component of successful business systems (see, e.g., Ben-Ner and 
Putterman, 2003).  In turn this is expected to lead to discernible differences in the nature and 
extent of the care and attention that team participants devote to their jobs and ultimately produce 
improvements in quality control.  
                                                 
9 Note that this view stands in sharp contrast to arrangements in the traditional vertically 
organized  firm (as modeled by theorists such as Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). 
10 A similar hypothesis was developed for call center workers by Batt (1999).   
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 The principal argument made by those who are more pessimistic as to the impact of 
teams upon firm performance is that teams may promote free riding by some team members 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). While this point is deserving of careful attention in many 
circumstances, arguably this argument is less persuasive when workers participate in cross-
functional off-line teams rather than on-line teams. Furthermore, since in most business 
organizations the economic game is repeated, then the incentives for all team members to engage 
in peer monitoring are strengthened. 
 Consequently the first of our two core hypotheses is whether the introduction of offline 
teams leads to behavioral changes (such as workers becoming more motivated, better informed, 
more resourceful, and more inventive) and, in turn, whether this produces measurable differences 
in discretionary effort and thus individual production of team members. A second and related 
hypothesis is whether this organizational innovation produces employees who better understand 
the crucial importance of quality for organizational success, resulting in differences in the care 
and attention that individuals devote to their jobs, and ultimately producing improvements in 
quality control by team members? 
In the bulk of the remainder of this section we briefly review the theoretical literature to 
develop four other hypotheses concerning team members. The first of these concerns the extent 
and the time profile of those organizational costs that may accompany the introduction of various 
forms of participation. In the case of offline teams, the key costs are the opportunity costs 
incurred when team members attend team meetings during regular hours.11 It is important to 
investigate hypotheses that bear on the extent and the time profile of these costs. Does the 
introduction of teams lead to opportunistic behavior by team members (who do not forego 
                                                 
11 Though offline teams in Japanese firms (such as celebrated QC circles) traditionally meet after 
regular hours with only limited or no compensation, offline teams in U.S. firms  normally meet during 
regular hours.  Thus the opportunity costs of offline teams are particularly important for U.S. firms.  See 
Kato (2003) for offline teams in Japanese firms.     
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compensation when attending meetings) leading to downtime growing over time (as teams 
become a vehicle for more opportunistic behavior by team members)? Or is it the case that team 
members do not engage in such opportunistic activities and that they become more efficient at 
conducting and implementing team business over time. Following Levine and Tyson (1990), our 
third hypothesis is that the introduction of participatory practices must be viewed as an 
investment by the firm. This organizational innovation is expected to be accompanied by some 
initial set-up and learning costs and increased downtime. But our expectation is that these costs 
will be dissipated over time, if teams function well. 
 The fourth set of hypotheses to be tested concern the time profile of the impact of teams 
on business performance. Some theoretical and empirical literature suggests that an individual 
change in organizational design is expected to be sufficient to produce sustained benefits to the 
firm.12 By contrast other literature argues that, for sustained benefits, complementary measures 
are needed. An individual initiative when introduced alone may be insufficient to lead to 
persistent gains. For example, employees might need more sharing of enterprise rewards through 
financial participation, such as profit sharing, gainsharing and employee stock ownership to 
accompany teams lest their commitment to teams becomes undermined (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1995, Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995, Kato and Morishima, 2002, and Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw, 
2005).  The QC circle literature often reports that the productivity-enhancing effects of QC 
circles introduced by U.S. firms in 1980s has proved to be short-lived since QCs lacked a 
complementary mechanism to delegate power to front-line workers (e.g., Lawler III, 1986, 
Griffin, 1988, Kochan and Osterman, 1994, Levine, 1995).   
An alternative explanation of the short-lived nature of the productivity effect of teams is 
that it is a Hawthorne effect.13 According to this line of reasoning, team members regard 
                                                 
12  See for example reviews in Blinder (1990) and in Blair and Kochan (2000). 
13 See, for instance, Batt (1999) for a discussion of  Hawthorne effects and teams.   
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themselves as special or they receive individual attention from management. Consequently, 
better performance does not flow from team membership per se, but rather from the special 
feelings felt by team members who are given unusual attention. However, such novelty tends to 
wear away over time and thus the performance improvement is expected to be short-lived.        
Our fifth hypothesis concerns a possible difference in team effects between employees 
who become team members after solicitation by management, compared to those who volunteer 
to become team members without management encouragement. We hypothesize that the 
performance-enhancing effects of team membership will be greater and more long-lasting for 
solicited members than for unsolicited members.  Moreover, the cost of team membership 
(increased downtime) will be smaller and diminish more rapidly as team members engage in 
learning by doing.  We conjecture that this difference may arise in part because skilful personnel 
managers will have a better sense of those individuals who likely will be both better fits as team 
members and also are more likely to continue to be motivated and to learn useful skills in 
teams. Second, it is possible that  some employees who volunteer to become team members with 
no management encouragement may be behaving opportunistically—they are simply seeking a 
paid break from their daily production work, provided that they are paid hourly and not by piece 
rate.  This line of reasoning also suggests that the performance-enhancing effects of team 
membership may be smaller and short-lived for such unsolicited and volunteered team members 
than for solicited members.  Third, it is also possible that management solicitation serves as a 
credible signal to the solicited workers that management considers them in the viable pool of 
candidates to become line supervisors (or in the promotion tournament).  Having been convinced 
that they are in the promotion tournament, they will be motivated to work harder to win the 
tournament.  Thus the performance-enhancing effect of team membership will be greater and 
more long-lasting for solicited members than for unsolicited members.   
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Hawthorne effects may be particularly relevant for solicited members.  Specifically, it is 
likely to be solicited team members (rather than volunteers) who consider themselves special or 
who receive particular attention from management.  Thus, the existence of a Hawthorne effect 
would also point to a greater initial improvement in performance after the start of team 
membership for solicited members than for other members.  However, since the literature also 
suggests that the Hawthorne effect should wear away over time, this implies that the 
performance-enhancing effect of team membership for solicited members is expected to be 
particularly short-lived. Hence, if it is a Hawthorne effect that is driving enhanced performance 
by solicited team members, the time profile of the performance improvements is predicted to be 
quite different compared to the pattern that is consistent with the first three hypotheses discussed 
previously. 
The sixth hypothesis concerns the relationship between the performance effects of team 
membership and the level of education.  It is plausible that team members with more education 
learn lessons from team activities and apply such lessons to their regular work more effectively. 
Simply put, education and teams may be complementary.  The potential importance of such 
complementarity has been suggested in the literature yet there is very little systematic evidence 
on it.14    
Finally we briefly consider the other main set of effects, the indirect or spillover effects. 
Teams may improve not only team members’ performance but also non-team members’ 
performance. One source of these gains flows from teams solving various work problems, thus 
contributing to the overall efficiency of the workplace and to both members and non-team 
members working in the same workplace improving their performance. Also, the better 
                                                 
14 For example, Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) find evidence for formal off-the-job 
training as an important ingredient of the high performance work system.  Our study complements their 
work by testing more directly whether improvement in individual worker performance as a result of team 
membership is greater for more highly educated workers.         
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alignment of the goals of team members with firm’s objectives may lead to more horizontal or 
per monitoring by team members so that non-team members are less likely to shirk and thus their 
performance also improves. While the central focus of this paper is the direct effects of teams, 
the available data will enable us to provide some limited evidence on indirect effects as well.15  
 
III. Previous Empirical Work 
 While there is an enormous amount of previous empirical work by economists in this 
broad area, most studies examine only our first hypothesis-- the impact of “participation” on 
business performance. Furthermore, for the most part, the empirical economics literature has not 
used data that provides direct evidence on the impact of participatory practices such as teams on 
the behavior of individual workers and then by extension to the impact on organizational and 
ultimately enterprise performance. Instead, in part because of the difficulties in obtaining 
adequate economic data for individuals, studies have used data at higher levels of aggregation—
mainly at the level of the firm, though increasingly at the plant level. In these studies, if links 
between, for example, enhanced business performance and “participation” have been identified 
then these have been ascribed to the influence of the existence of a particular participatory 
practice on individual behavior. However, such ascription does involve a leap of faith—the 
available evidence on the posited link between individual behavior and firm performance 
remains largely indirect. 
Similarly, the need to use data at the firm or establishment level has meant that testing of 
hypotheses that relate to the expected timing of the impact of participation, or to the effect of 
differences in individual worker characteristics largely have been unable to be undertaken.  Also, 
                                                 
15 As in the case of many Japanese quality circles (Kaizen, JK, ZD), the offline team introduced 
by our case stresses the importance of not only the actual outcome (concrete solutions to problems) but 
also the process of problem solving in team (transforming regular front-line workers to motivated, 
inventive, “smart” workers who are more cognizant of the crucial importance of quality). 
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the literature has tended to focus on the impact of participation on outcomes that are comparable 
across firms, such as value added (rather than production) and much less attention has been 
devoted to the impact of participation on outcomes such as quality.16 
 There are, however, a handful of studies that do make important steps in beginning to 
provide direct evidence on hypothesized links between HPWPs such as teams and individual 
behavior.  A number of pioneering studies (e.g.  Lazear, 2000, Kleiner and Helper, 2003, Fernie 
and Metcalf, 1999, Paarsh and Shearer, 1999, and Knez and Simester, 2001), focus on the effects 
on individual worker performance of the switch from time rates to piece rates or to performance 
pay.17 A related line of work examines the effects on individual worker performance of the shift 
to team production (e.g. Batt, 1999 and Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan, 2002).18 
The research of Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2002) is probably the closest to our 
study.  They use panel data for a textile plant to empirically examine worker productivity and 
participation as the plant gradually moved to a team production system.  They find among other 
things that the adoption of on-line teams at the plant improved worker productivity by 14% on 
average.  Our study differs from theirs in three important ways.19  First, we examine the impact 
of offline team membership as opposed to online team membership.  In this sense, both studies 
are complementary.  Second, we use not only a productivity measure but also two additional 
performance measures, including the product rejection rate, which is an objective measure of 
quality, and downtime.  Finally, our rich data includes measures of worker characteristics and 
                                                 
16 An important exception is Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) who use plant-level data on 
productivity and product quality.    
17 More recent contributions include Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005) and Shi (2007)..  
18 Nagin, et al. (2002) examines the impact on opportunistic behavior of call center employees of 
exogenously introduced variation in monitoring.   
19 There is, however, an important methodological implication of this difference in the type of 
teams. Once individuals become online team members, individual performance data may no longer be 
available and instead may have to be replaced with aggregate team performance data (as in Hamilton, 
Nickerson and Owan, 2002).  By contrast, in our study, the available performance data do not change 
before and after individuals become offline team members. By continuing to have access to individual 
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thus allow us to test additional hypotheses, notably whether the performance effects of team 
membership are greater for team members with more formal schooling and team members who 
were sought after by management.   
 
IV. The Case, Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 Our case, hereafter PARTS, is a privately owned, non-unionized subsidiary of a 
multinational firm. At the end of November 2001 PARTS employed 225 employees, including 
134 operators who were directly involved with production.  PARTS is a single-plant firm (as 
opposed to a multi-plant firm), and all 134 operators work in the same plant.  PARTS has grown 
rapidly from 30 workers in 1988 and real sales have tripled since 1995. However the industry is 
very competitive and profit margins are thin. 
PARTS is a light manufacturing firm that makes a range of small components mainly to be 
used by larger manufacturers.20 Typically production items are produced in large runs. While 
products would not be classified as “hi tech,” customers demand high quality—e.g. they specify 
very low tolerances in crucial components that PARTS manufactures. These parts are produced 
by different machines that require different though typically not very high levels of skill to 
operate. While the nature of the technology sets limits to rates of production, the machines 
permit large discretion in tasks performed by operators so that there is much scope for variation 
in the quality of the product produced by different operators who use the same machine. 
 During the study period, hourly workers typically started at $6, though normally within a 
year they were earning $7.50 an hour.  During the decade preceding our study this firm had 
                                                                                                                                                             
daily performance data we believe we are using those data that are most pertinent for rigorous hypothesis 
testing of the impact of membership in offline teams. 
20 Our confidentiality agreement with PARTS prohibits us from identifying the specific product 
they produce. 
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never laid off employees although occasionally the firm had dispatched workers on a fixed term 
basis (6 months) to neighboring firms. 
Teams were started at PARTS in June 1999 after the introduction of teams by the parent 
firm.  The CEO appears to have taken the introduction of teams seriously, including hiring a full-
time consultant with long experience in the introduction of teams at other firms. Each team 
consists of on average of eight team members including one engineer. All team members except 
for the assigned engineer are operators from different workplaces. As in the case of many offline 
teams introduced by U.S. firms, teams are modeled after Japanese small group activities (QC 
circles).21 Each team works on a series of specific themes and meets on average for 30 to 45 
minutes a week. As such they are offline teams as opposed to online teams (the wholesale 
transformation of regular workplaces into self-directed team production units, such as cell 
production or modular production). As in the case of many Japanese QC circles, outcome 
(concrete solution to a specific theme or problem) is just as important as process, through which 
team members learn valuable lessons, become more motivated, more inventive and “smarter” 
workers with clearer awareness of the importance of quality control. The only notable departure 
from traditional Japanese QC circles is that team meetings at PARTS take place during regular 
hours as opposed to after hours. 22  
Importantly for our analysis the way teams were introduced means that not all workers 
were team members.  Participation in teams is in principle voluntary although management 
sometimes solicits certain workers to become team members (we will discuss this in more detail 
later as well).   There is no compensation for team participation, although team participation is 
evaluated as an important part of the annual performance evaluation process.  
                                                 
21 We observed team meetings and could not help noticing the frequent use of typical Japanese 
QC circle vocabularies, such as Kaizen, Zero Defects, and Just-in-time.  
22 For detailed institutional information on Small Group Activities in Japan, see for instance Cole 
(1989) and Kato (2003). 
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 The centrality of teams in the evolving system of human resource management practices 
at PARTS is perhaps indicated by the relatively limited development of other “high performance 
workplace practices.” Thus while all-employee meetings are held each month (in fact on pay 
day, the second Thursday of every month), the meetings last only 30 minutes and there are rarely 
questions and answers and confidential information is not shared. Perhaps more importantly, 
financial participation by non-managerial employees is quite limited. There is, for example, no 
plan providing for profit sharing or employee ownership. However, during the last four years the 
firm has contributed $500 each year to each employee’s 401K plan as a discretionary bonus. 
Employees seem to expect to receive this bonus unless the firm has a particularly bad year. 
Neither management nor labor considers it a profit sharing plan.   
To help to gain a detailed knowledge of the nature of production and the realities of key 
dimensions of labor relations at the plant, several types of data were gathered. Special attention 
was paid to the nature and functioning of offline teams. During a preparatory stage, lengthy 
interviews with diverse, notably managerial personnel, were conducted. Also a questionnaire was 
completed that used responses from the principal HR manager. Finally, worker shadowing 
exercises were conducted over periods of one to three months. These data sources provide much 
suggestive anecdotal information that, in general, team members viewed teams in a positive 
light. Thus during worker-shadowing one worker attested: "Recommendations made by teams 
affect our work at least to some extent and plans are very likely to be carried out". At the same 
time we heard claims that while teams may initially have had favorable impacts, over time these 
benefits were believed to have lessened. Also the CEO told us that he was clearly aware of 
falling enthusiasm among team members. In other words, with the passage of time, in the 
absence of tangible rewards, the interest of employees in being cooperative and their levels of 
loyalty appear to have fallen.  
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We also observed several examples of projects that offline teams at PARTS had suggested 
and which have been implemented. For example, the existing labeling system for spare parts was 
somewhat illogical and quite confusing. A team decided to tackle this problem. All members of 
the team began with studying production process and various parts used in the process, and 
eventually developed a new labeling system which reduced the time required for labeling by half 
and reduced product defect caused by the use of wrong parts. Through such team activities, all 
team members acquired a deeper understanding of not only the labeling system but also the 
overall production system and developed a more acute awareness of the devastating 
consequences of using wrong parts and hence generating faulty products. Furthermore, naturally 
all members of the team were intimately familiar with the new labeling system and hence their 
regular daily operations also benefitted from such deep knowledge of the new labeling system.   
To provide more systematic information on the potential impact of teams on worker 
attitudes and behaviors (and thus potentially on firm outcomes), we also undertook an unusual 
face-to-face survey of workers in March 2001 and received a very high response rate (close to 90 
percent).  Since findings from that study are detailed elsewhere, here we simply summarize the 
major findings.23 Relative to non-team members, team participants consider themselves to be 
more empowered, sensed that more information was being shared by management, 
communicated more often with managers and supervisors within their work groups or teams, and 
communicated more often with workers outside of their work groups or teams. In addition the 
survey findings indicate that participants in teams put more effort into their work. The evidence 
is equally suggestive that attitudes and thus potentially the behavior of team members was being 
affected in other ways. Thus we find some evidence for participants displaying stronger 
organizational commitment and more trust towards management. In addition we note that team 
                                                 
23 See Jones, Kato and Weinberg (2003). 
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members are, more satisfied with their jobs, more positive about the use and contributions of 
their knowledge and skills and that there is no difference between team members and other 
workers concerning views on job stress. 
 In sum, findings based on interviews with HR officials, worker-shadowing, and surveys 
of individual employees together present a reasonably consistent story suggesting that the 
introduction of and membership in offline teams has been producing behavioral change in team 
members. However, there were also some indications that there were some interesting dynamics 
at work concerning the impact of these developments on individual behaviors. Finally, these data 
provide reasonably strong evidence of change in many of those areas that several theorists have 
long stressed, including trust, commitment and discretionary effort.  
 To provide compelling evidence, however, that teams do lead to actual changes in 
measurable outcomes such as production, hypotheses must be tested using appropriate and 
detailed economic data. In this respect we were fortunate to obtain two sets of data for all 134 
operators who were employed by PARTS as of November 30, 2001.  First, for each of these 134 
operators, we collected daily performance data during the 35-month period, from January 1, 
1999 through November 30, 2001. These daily performance data were then matched with 
personnel records containing information on worker characteristics, including date of hire and 
education.   These records also indicate whether individual workers were team members at some 
point during the period of data collection and, if so, whether they were volunteers or solicited by 
management. Hence we end up with a very large rich and unusually reliable micro data set.24 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for operators.  The average operator is 39 years old 
with 3.8 years of tenure with PARTS, and his/her wage is quite low ($7.64 an hour).   The bulk 
                                                 
24 We also have daily performance data for those operators who worked during part of this period 
yet were no longer employed by PARTS on November 30, 2001.  Unfortunately, PARTS did not keep 
personnel records on these workers and hence we know very little about their worker characteristics (most 
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of operators (62%) are female and 33% have education beyond high school (yet virtually nobody 
has a 4-year college degree).25  To see if team members differ systematically from non-team 
members in terms of some key worker characteristics, we also report descriptive statistics 
according to team status.  From Table 1 we see that 54 operators joined teams during the sample 
period. Reassuringly in most respects the characteristics of team participants and those who were 
never in teams are quite similar.26 The only exception is gender, with team members much more 
apt to be female.  In short, except for gender, there is no evidence to suggest systematic bias in 
team participation in terms of observable worker characteristics.    
Data were collected for three key measures of individual performance. The first measure 
is EFFICIENCY which expresses individual production as a percentage of a “norm” that is set 
for each machine (and which remained unchanged during the sample period.) Since most 
machines have an automatic counter that records each workers’ output each day, these data are 
extraordinarily reliable. The set of EFFICIENCY numbers for a worker during a year is used in 
the annual evaluation of each worker’s performance by his supervisor. 
The second performance measure is the REJECTION RATE. This is a measure of quality 
and records the amount of defective production produced by an individual as a percentage of that 
individual’s production. To compile these data each production worker’s output is tested 
randomly (on average every other day.) Thus the REJECTION RATE is recorded for each 
worker for each audit day. Again these data are most unusual and are apt to be characterized by 
very tiny measurement errors. These sets of rejection rate data, as gathered during a year for each 
                                                                                                                                                             
importantly their dates of hire).  However, when possible, we will use the daily performance data for 
those “job leavers” to check the robustness of our results.    
25 Unfortunately data on education are missing for 31 workers. 
26 Note that in many respects the workers in the firm are quite homogeneous. In addition there are 
no sharp differences in race and nationality. In such circumstances we expect that “social connectedness” 
is apt to be high (Glaeser et al., 1999). Consequently we might expect that the potential for the 
introduction of teams fostering trust is especially high in such circumstances. 
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individual, are also used as part of the annual evaluation process of each worker’s performance 
by her supervisor.  
The third performance measure is individual DOWNTIME. This measures downtime 
hours for each individual for each day and includes all time not spent in production. This 
includes time spent setting up a station, time spent waiting for parts, machine repair, greasing, 
various meetings (including team meetings), training, cleaning up time, and time spent on any 
other breaks (including for illness and snacks.) Again these data are collected for each individual 
for each day. 
Data for the three measures are shown in Table 2. Average EFFICIENCY, REJECTION 
RATE, and DOWNTIME for all workers are, respectively 83.487%, 0.561%, and 0.890 hours 
per day.  The rest of Table 2 presents average EFFICIENCY, REJECTION RATE, and 
DOWNTIME before and after individual workers become team members.27  The data reveal that 
for all team members average EFFICIENCY is higher after joining a team (84.955 vs. 78.643%) 
representing an average 6.312 percentage-point improvement in productivity.  Turning to the 
data on the REJECTION RATE we see that the average REJECTION RATE is considerably 
lower for team members (0.399 vs. 0.814%). This represents an average 0.415 percentage-point 
improvement in this measure of quality after workers became team members. Finally, when we 
look at DOWNTIME we see that average DOWNTIME is higher after workers joined teams 
(0.969 vs. 0.665) or, on average, 0.304 hours (18 minutes a day) higher.  All differences in 
average EFFICIENCY, REJECTION RATE, and DOWNTIME before and after team 
membership are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.   
For team members, we undertake similar analyses depending on whether or not team 
membership resulted from management solicitation and whether team members have education 
                                                 
27 During the 35-month period, no team member quit participating in his/her team to become a 
non-team member.   
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beyond high school or not.28 These findings are reported in Table 2. For all sub-groups of team 
members we find similar directional changes in all three performance measures after joining 
teams.  All differences in average EFFICIENCY, REJECTION RATE, and DOWNTIME before 
and after the onset of team membership are statistically significant at the 1 percent level except 
for EFFICIENCY of team members without education beyond high school.  Solicited team 
members show a substantially greater improvement in the REJECTION RATE than do 
unsolicited team members, whereas the size of EFFICIENCY gains seem to be somewhat 
smaller for solicited members than for unsolicited members. We also observe that unsolicited 
members increase their DOWNTIME after team membership begins considerably more than 
solicited members; this suggests possible opportunistic behavior by unsolicited members. With 
regard to education, the size of improvements in EFFICIENCY and REJECTION RATE appear 
to be greater for more educated workers than for less educated workers, whereas the size of the 
increase in DOWNTIME increase seems to be comparable, suggesting a possible 
complementarity between education and teams.   
Finally, to see if team members perform differently to begin with than non-members, we 
add descriptive statistics for non-team members to Table 2. These data show that it is non-
members that have higher EFFICIENCY and lower REJECTION RATE (compared to team 
members, at least before they joined teams). In other words, there appears to be no “cherry 
picking.” In addition, team members (at least before they joined teams) had lower DOWNTIME 
than non-members—there is no evidence that team members were prone to have more downtime 
to begin with than non-members.     
      
                                                 
28 The data on whether or not each team member was solicited by management are provided by 
the full-time consultant who has been in charge of all team activities since the introduction of offline 
teams.  
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V. Empirical Strategy and Findings on Worker Performance 
To investigate with more precision the suggestive findings from the previous section, we 
undertake a number of exercises.  Our baseline model is a simple fixed effects model:  
(1)  Pit = αMEMBERit + β(DAYS IN TEAM)it +(individual specific fixed effects)  
+ (monthly time dummy variables) + uit 
where Pit is performance of worker i in day t; MEMBERit is a dummy variable which takes the 
value of 1 if worker i is a team member in day t, and the value of zero otherwise. This model 
enables us to investigate the first four hypotheses, including our two core hypotheses concerning 
the impact of teams on productivity and quality. That is, for the three measures of Pit (namely 
EFFICIENCY, REJECTION RATE and DOWNTIME), the estimated coefficients on 
MEMBERit are used to test whether or not team membership affects individual performance.  In 
addition, we include (DAYS IN TEAM)it (the number of days in a team in 100 days) in order to 
test the fourth hypothesis concerning whether or not the impact of organizational changes 
introduced alone can deliver sustained benefits in firm performance. That is, in the absence of 
complementary initiatives the performance effects of team may be expected to change 
(deteriorate) as that program continues without the benefit of other reforms.  
We include individual specific fixed effects to capture the time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity of our workers.  In particular, individual specific fixed effects will attempt to 
control for differences among workers in their innate abilities.  If workers with high innate 
abilities are more likely to join teams, the coefficients on MEMBER might indicate the effects of 
superior innate abilities of workers in general as well as the actual effects of team membership. 
Individual specific fixed effects will help separate the two effects.   
We also include 34 monthly time dummy variables to capture time-specific shocks to 
PARTS that are common to all production workers. (There are actually 35 monthly time dummy 
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variables from January 1999 through November 2001.  We use the January 1999 time dummy 
variable as a reference month.)   
To see if the estimated coefficients on MEMBERit and (DAYS IN TEAM)it change when 
the tenure of the worker is controlled for, we also considered an additional specification. In this 
estimate, the tenure of the worker (the number of days for which he/she has been with PARTS) 
and its square are added to Eq. (1).29 
The coefficient on MEMBERit can be interpreted as gauging how much each individual 
worker’s performance changes as a result of his/her participation in an offline team.  The coefficient 
on (DAYS IN TEAM)it can be interpreted as indicating to what extent the initial impact of team 
participation changes as his/her team experience increases.   
Note that the coefficient on MEMBERit is not capturing the indirect spillover effect of team 
participation on performance of non-team members and hence the overall factory-wide 
performance.  Estimation of such overall team effects is usually subject to a selection issue.  That is, 
all workers realize that the introduction of offline teams signifies that the firm's HR strategy is 
shifting more towards a high performance/high involvement HR system whereby high-ability 
workers are more highly valued and low-ability workers find work more challenging, demanding 
and difficult.  As a result, low-ability workers find the shift an unwelcoming event and are more 
prone to quit than high-ability workers.  If this is the case, the overall performance of the firm 
will improve even if there is no motivational effect of the introduction of teams on team 
members since the introduction of teams weeds out low-ability workers.   
  However, the focus of this study is not overall firm-wide team effects, but rather 
the changes in performance of the same worker before and after joining a team.  At the same 
                                                 
29 To avoid multicollinearity between time dummy variables and TENURE, we also tried to 
restrict the sum of all monthly time effects to be zero.  The estimated coefficients on MEMBER and 
DAYS IN TEAM prove to be insensitive to such a restriction. 
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time, we recognize that if poorly performing team members are more likely to quit than are other 
team members, then the estimated coefficients on MEMBERit would be subject to a similar 
selection issue (or we would be overestimating the motivational effect on team members of team 
participation).  However, our data reveal that no team member quit during the 35-month study 
period.  This total absence of attrition from teams was confirmed by managers of PARTS. Hence, 
we expect the selection issue to be much less relevant in this study.  To confirm this conjecture, 
we will examine whether the estimated coefficient on MEMBERit will change significantly when 
including those operators who left PARTS during the 35-month period.   
Table 3A summarizes the fixed effect estimates of Eq. (1).30  We begin first by discussing 
findings for the first hypothesis on the impact of team membership on EFFICIENCY (we drop 
subscripts for exposition from now on.)  A clear and consistent finding is that there is a positive 
and significant effect on EFFICIENCY of MEMBER thus indicating that team membership leads 
to improvements in productivity.  This effect is apparent in both specifications (with and without 
controlling for the possible tenure effect) and is estimated at plausible levels (about a 3% gain in 
EFFICIENCY).   
The effects of team membership on the REJECTION RATE are also reported in the same 
table.  Essentially the results reported parallel those for EFFICIENCY. The key result is a clear 
and consistent finding of a negative and significant effect on the REJECTION RATE of 
MEMBER, thus indicating that team membership results in an improvement in quality. While 
the average improvement in the REJECTION RATE is a modest 0.15 percentage point, this 
                                                 
30 One might wish to adjust the standard errors to account for possible clustering due to the 
possibility that the error terms of operators on the same team are correlated. Unfortunately, we are unable 
to calculate cluster-adjusted standard errors, for we do not know who belongs to which team. 
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represents a 27% improvement in the average REJECTION RATE and thus constitutes strong 
support for our second core hypothesis.31  
 To provide a test of the third hypothesis we begin by examining the impact of teams on 
DOWNTIME. In both specifications (with and without controlling for tenure effects), 
membership in a team is accompanied by a positive and significant effect on DOWNTIME -- 
team membership results in more downtime. Specifically, for the average team member there is a  
0.25 hour (15 minutes) increase in daily DOWNTIME to begin with. This is consistent with 
hypotheses that predict the existence of significant initial costs to investing in participatory 
institutions such as teams.  The major cost in this case is the forgone operation hours of team 
members since team meetings are held during regular working hours.  But in addition, we 
observe that the estimated coefficients on DAYS IN TEAM are negative and statistically 
significant, falling by about 6% in 100 days after becoming a team member. This indicates that 
the cost of teams will diminish as team members increase their experience with teams and learn 
how to run their team meetings effectively. Thus again we have strong support for our 
hypothesis. 
In examining the evidence as it bears on the fourth hypothesis, we note that in the 
EFFICIENT estimates, the negative coefficient on DAYS IN TEAM indicates that the positive 
team effect will diminish as time goes by.  Specifically, the positive team effect on 
EFFICIENCY will fall by about 10% per 100 days in team.  Furthermore, we observe a similar 
effect in the REJECTION RATE equation -- the team effect will weaken as DAYS IN TEAM 
rises, specifically diminishing by about 16% in 100 days after the average worker becomes a 
team member. As such these findings provide evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis 
that, in the absence of complementary initiatives, the beneficial effects of measures introduced 
                                                 
31 We also used Tobit models to account for zeros in REJECTION RATE and found no 
discernable changes in our results. 
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alone (such as teams) can be expected to be short-lived as the motivational effects of employee 
involvement alone are undermined over time.   
As we argued earlier, the performance-enhancing effect of team membership may be due 
to learning, i.e., team members learn through team activities new skill/knowledge that is useful 
for their regular work. Such a human capital interpretation of the performance-enhancing effect 
of team membership is also consistent with our results. Initially team members take full 
advantage of their newly acquired human capital and improve their performance. However, in 
the absence of financial participation which links worker pay to performance, workers will stop 
taking full advantage of their new skill/knowledge acquired through team activities and hence 
performance gains are eroded over time.  
Note that our evidence is also consistent with the Hawthorne effect.  However, later we 
will provide evidence that the Hawthorne effect interpretation may not be particularly relevant to 
our case.    
To check whether our estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of those workers who left 
PARTS during the period, we re-run the regressions reported in Table 3A but also include data 
for operators who left during the period. There results are reported in Table 3B. As expected, it is 
clear that our key findings are unaffected by the inclusion of these data for “job leavers”. The 
size and direction of all coefficients are essentially unaltered by the use of this larger data set.32 
To study team effects separately for solicited and unsolicited team members, we modify 
Eq. (1) as follows: 
(2)  Pit = αS(SOLICITED MEMBER)it  
+ βS(SOLICITED MEMBER)it*(DAYS IN TEAM)it  
+ αU(UNSOLICITED MEMBER)it  
                                                 
32 Since no personnel records are available for those who left during the sample period, we are 
unable to consider the tenure of the worker as an additional control. 
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+ βU(UNSOLICITED MEMBER)it*(DAYS IN TEAM)it  
+(individual specific fixed effects) + (monthly time dummy variables) + uit 
where (SOLICITED MEMBER)it is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if worker i is a 
solicited team member in day t, and the value of zero otherwise; and (UNSOLICITED 
MEMBER)it is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if worker i is an unsolicited team 
member in day t, and the value of zero otherwise.   
Likewise, to study the team effects separately for team members with and without 
education beyond high school, we modify Eq. (1) as follows: 
(3)  Pit = αM(MORE EDUCATED MEMBER)it  
+ βM(MORE EDUCATED MEMBER)it*(DAYS IN TEAM)it  
+ αL(LESS EDUCATED MEMBER)it  
+ βL(LESS EDUCATED MEMBER)it*(DAYS IN TEAM)it  
+(individual specific fixed effects) + (monthly time dummy variables) + uit 
where (MORE EDUCATED MEMBER)it is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
worker i has education beyond high school and is a team member in day t, and the value of zero 
otherwise; and (LESS EDUCATED MEMBER)it is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 
if worker i does not have education beyond high school and is a team member in day t, and the 
value of zero otherwise.   
 Table 4A reports the fixed effect estimates of Eq. (2).  The most striking and statistically 
significant difference in the team effects between solicited and unsolicited team members lies in 
the time profile of the team effects. The performance gains from team membership will fall as 
unsolicited members spend more time in teams whereas they will not fall as solicited members 
spend more time in teams (in fact, the positive EFFICIENCY gains from team membership will 
rise significantly as time passes for solicited members). Furthermore, concerning DOWNTIME, 
and again as expected, the increase in DOWNTIME as a result of team membership is 
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considerably greater for unsolicited members than for solicited members.  In addition, such 
increases in DOWNTIME will fall more slowly for unsolicited members as time goes by.  All 
these differences between solicited and unsolicited members are found to be statistically 
significant at least at the 5 percent level.  Finally, the team effects on EFFICIENCY and the 
REJECTION RATE are found to be greater for solicited team members than for unsolicited 
members although we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of αS  = αU at the 10 percent level.     
In sum, the evidence is consistent with our conjecture that skilful personnel managers 
will have a better sense of those individuals who will likely be better fits as team members and 
also which individuals are more likely to continue to get motivated and to learn useful skills in 
teams. Our findings also support the hypotheses that some of those employees who volunteer to 
become team members with no management encouragement may be behaving opportunistically 
— they are simply seeking a paid break from their daily production work.  Furthermore our 
findings support the signaling hypothesis that management solicitation serves as a credible signal 
to solicited workers that management considers them in the viable pool of candidates to become 
line supervisors.  Finally, we find no evidence that the performance-enhancing effect of team 
membership erodes over time for solicited members whereas we do find such evidence for non-
solicited members.  As such, these findings are not consistent with the Hawthorne effect which 
predicts that the dissipation of the performance-enhancing effect of teams over time will be 
particularly relevant to solicited members. 
To further shed light on the observed differences in the team effects between solicited 
and unsolicited team members, we run a “pre-program” regression.  That is,  
(4) Pit = α + βS(SOLICITED MEMBER)i + βU(UNSOLICITED MEMBER)i 
+  γXit + (monthly time dummy variables) + uit 
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where t is from January 1, 1999 to May 31, 1999 (i.e. the period prior to the introduction of 
offline teams); SOLICITED MEMBERi = 1 if worker i eventually becomes a solicited member, 
0 otherwise; UNSOLICITED MEMBERi = 1 if worker i eventually becomes an unsolicited 
member, 0 otherwise; and Xit is a vector of personal characteristics of worker i in day t that may 
affect his/her performance and our data enable us to control for his/her education level, gender, 
tenure, and its square.  For example, when measuring Pit by efficiency, the estimated coefficients 
on (SOLICITED MEMBER)i and (UNSOLICITED MEMBER)i indicate whether solicited 
members (unsolicited members) were initially (prior to the introduction of teams) more or less 
productive than those who never become team members, after controlling for personal 
characteristics and time effects.  If statistically significant differences in the estimated 
coefficients between solicited and unsolicited members emerge, potentially this will provide 
additional insights into the process by which managers solicit team-members.   
 Table 4B summarizes the OLS estimates of Eq. (4).  After controlling for tenure, 
education, gender and time effects, prior to the introduction of teams, solicited team members 
were found to be 9 percentage-points less efficient than non-team members, while unsolicited 
team members were 13 percentage-points less efficient than non-team members.  The efficiency 
differential between solicited and unsolicited team members is found to be statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level.  The quality measure (rejection rate) results suggest that 
solicited team members were initially producing substantially more defects than non-team 
members, whereas unsolicited team members were similar to non-team members in terms of 
their rejection rates.  The quality differential between solicited and unsolicited team members is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  Finally, for solicited members, downtime was 
initially more than 20 minutes less per day than for non-team members, whereas downtime for 
unsolicited members was initially 15 minutes less than for non-team members.  The pre-program 
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differential in downtime between solicited and unsolicited members is found to be statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level.   
In short, our pre-program regression results suggest that even after controlling for 
observable individual characteristics of workers and time effects, management solicitation 
appears to have been focused on underperforming operators, in particular those with more room 
for quality improvement.  In addition, the targeted operators were also initially spending more 
time on production and hence had more room for downtime to increase, such as through team 
meetings.  
Conceivably, initially solicited operators might have been operating particularly difficult 
machines which resulted in low efficiency and high rejection rates and, after participating in 
teams, they might have been assigned to easier machines.  If this were in fact the case, then the 
observed efficiency and quality gains from team membership would simply have resulted from 
such systematic machine reassignments.  However, based on extensive and separate interviews 
with the CEO, the general production manager and a key contact who is in charge of teams, we 
are persuaded that the introduction of team membership was not accompanied by any systematic 
task reassignments.33  
 The fixed effect estimates of Eq. (3) are reported in Table 5.  The most significant 
difference between more and less educated team members is found in the team effects on the 
REJECTION RATE.  The estimated coefficient on MEMBER is statistically significant only for 
more educated team members, implying that the quality gains from team membership are felt 
only by team members with more education.  The estimated coefficient on (LESS EDUCATED 
MEMBER)*(DAYS IN TEAM) is, however, negative and statistically significant. This suggests 
that, for less educated team members, while there is no immediate team effect on the 
                                                 
33 In addition, it is difficult to reconcile the machine reassignment interpretation of the team 
effects with the dissipation of the effects over time.     
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REJECTION RATE, with the passage of time they begin to learn to convert their team 
experiences into their daily performance in quality assurance.  For DOWNTIME, as educated 
team members engage in learning by doing, the cost of team membership (increased downtime) 
will diminish. No such significant learning effects are found for less educated workers.  For 
EFFICIENCY, as expected, the team effects appear to be greater and more long-lasting for more 
educated team members than for less educated team members, although these differences are 
found to be statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level.  Overall, our findings are generally 
consistent with the sixth hypotheses that there is a complementarity between education and 
teams.   
Finally we briefly consider evidence on indirect spillover effects. In Figure 1 we plot the 
estimated time effects of “Efficiency” from Eq. (1) along with the number of offline team 
members.  Similarly, Figure 2 shows the estimated time effects of “Rejection Rate” from Eq. (2) 
along with the number of offline teams.  Both Figures show productivity and quality improving 
over time, though quality improvements appear more promptly.34 These patterns coincide with 
the diffusion of offline teams among operators at PARTS and suggest the presence of indirect 
spillover effects as captured by estimated time effects.  However, since the estimated time effects 
also include the effects of other external shocks common to all operators at PARTS, such as 
demand shocks and trends, unfortunately the precise magnitude of the indirect spillover effects 
cannot be identified.   
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Interviews with the CEO, the production manager, and the manager in charge of teams all confirm 
that there were no major technological changes (such as the introduction of new machines) at PARTS 
during the study period. 
 
 31
VI. Conclusions and Implications 
We use extraordinary data to provide some of the most reliable evidence to date on 
diverse hypotheses concerning the economic impact of offline teams, which are an increasingly 
important and common form of employee participation in economies around the world. Our first 
core hypothesis concerns the direct impact of offline teams and employee involvement on 
individual performance. Based on daily data for various measures of performance including 
rejection (quality) and production rates for all operators in a single plant during a 35 month 
period, we find that membership in offline teams results in enhanced performance. While the size 
of these initial effects depends on the particular specification, gains in efficiency average about 
3%, which is a quite believable number given the relatively limited scope that the production 
process provides for discretionary effort to affect output rates.  In our reading of the literature, 
we find no econometric estimates on the productivity effect of offline teams to which our 
estimates can be compared.  However, Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2002) report a 14- 
percent gain in productivity from the adoption of online teams which is considerably larger than 
our estimated productivity gain.  We believe that one of the main reasons for the relatively small 
productivity gain estimates in our study is that we are capturing only the direct impact on 
motivation, goal alignment and human capital formation (and thus productivity) for team 
members of the adoption of offline teams.  Our estimated productivity gain does not include 
possible indirect spillover effects, such as teams solving various productivity problems (and thus 
enhancing the overall efficiency of the workplace), and team members engaging in peer 
monitoring and knowledge sharing with non-team members (and hence enhancing non-members’ 
productivity).   Consequently our findings may be viewed as lower bound estimates of the effects 
of teams. The gross gains from teams (and which include indirect spillover effects) may well be 
greater than what we have captured by our estimates of the direct gains. 
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We also provide what may be the first rigorous estimates of the impact of any form of 
employee involvement, including teams, on product quality. According to our estimates, we find 
strong support for our second hypothesis-- team membership leads to rejection rates improving 
by about 27%. These findings on output and quality are consistent with hypotheses that predict 
that the introduction of (and membership in) teams will produce more trust by employees in 
management, improved goal alignment between managers and employees and thus enhanced 
discretionary effort and improved attention to quality.  While our evidence may be viewed as 
complementary to other studies, we again underscore the most unusual nature of our data. Thus, 
following the adoption of a high performance work system that includes teams among other 
innovative work practices, Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) also find a statistically 
significant positive impact on a physical measure of product quality of steel finishing lines. But 
whereas we use individual worker data, Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) use plant-level 
data. Also Batt (1999) finds a statistically significant positive effect of online teams for call 
center workers, though a self-reported rather than an objective measure of quality is used.   
We also find clear evidence that the improvements in enterprise outcomes are not 
sustained at their initial levels.35 Improvements tend to dissipate over time at a rate of 10 to 16% 
per 100 days in team.  However this finding is unsurprising to those who stress the need for 
complementarities in HR initiatives.  
The introduction of teams is also initially accompanied by significant costs as rates of 
downtime increase. However, consistent with those who predict team-learning effects, these 
costs diminish over time. As such, HPWPs are best viewed as investments.   
Moreover, we find differences in performance following team membership for members 
solicited by mangers compared to those who volunteer as well as differences in pre-program 
                                                 
35 As such, our evidence is consistent with the QC circle literature that generally reports the 
transitory nature of the benefits of QC circles  (e.g., Lawler III, 1986, Griffin, 1988, Levine, 1995).     
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performance.  These findings are consistent with various hypotheses including management’s 
ability to observe the relevant worker qualities, tournament incentives and opportunistic behavior 
by employees, but inconsistent with hypotheses based on Hawthorne effects.  Finally, we find 
evidence of a complementarity between teams and formal education.  
 One implication of our finding concerns the payoffs to possible managerial choices that 
are available to firms today. Some economic theorists argue that firms that operate in today’s 
competitive labor and product markets, have very little discretion in setting wage, employment 
and human resource management practices. Consequently, these practices are predicted to be 
broadly similar across firms in similar situations. However, the evidence presented in this paper 
provides evidence that firms can introduce changes (such as teams) and that, as in the case of 
PARTS, when a serious attempt is made to introduce an innovative HR policy such as teams, 
non-negligible benefits to firms are often delivered. Our empirical findings provide much more 
solid support than was perhaps previously available for those who hypothesize that participatory 
practices can enhance business performance, even in settings where employee tasks are fairly 
simple and employees are relatively low-skilled and the firm uses relatively simple technologies 
to produce components and employs rural low-wage workers with limited education. Finally, our 
findings indicate that the payoffs to such single innovations may not persist and that the design 
of HR polices in firms needs constant attention. To provide for enduring gains in firm 
performance, most likely will require the introduction of complementary initiatives. 
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Table 1 Basic Worker Characteristics of Team Members and Non-team Members as of November 30, 2001
All operators Members Non-members
Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N
Tenure (years) 3.83 3.72 134 3.52 2.84 54 4.04 4.23 80
Age 39.25 12.17 134 37.29 9.55 54 40.56 13.56 80
hourly wage (dollars) 7.64 1.32 134 7.67 1.27 54 7.63 1.37 80
Proportion male (%) 38.06 134 27.78** 54 45.00 80
Proportion with education beyond high school (%) 33.33 102 40.00 40 29.03 62
Source: Personnel data provided by PARTS
Note: ***the difference between members and non-members statistically significant at the 1% level 
**the difference between members and non-members statistically significant at the 5% level 
*the difference between members and non-members statistically significant at the 10% level 
Table 2 EFFICIENCY, REJECTION RATE, and DOWNTIME
EFFICIENCY REJECTION RATE DOWNTIME
individual production individual defective production individual 
as a percentage of norm as a percentage of total production downtime hours
All employees Mean 83.487 0.561 0.890
S.D. 25.756 1.775 1.067
N 52944 30263 52657
All non-team members Mean 84.196 0.502 0.918
S.D. 26.904 1.713 1.065
N 30734 16827 30705
All team members Before Mean 78.643 0.814 0.665
After Mean 84.955 0.399 0.969
Difference 6.312*** -0.415*** 0.304***
More educated members Before Mean 82.706 0.684 0.819
After Mean 86.912 0.358 0.965
Difference 4.206*** -0.326*** 0.146***
Less educated members Before Mean 82.973 0.559 0.867
After Mean 83.181 0.410 0.991
Difference 0.208 -0.149*** 0.124***
Solicited members Before Mean 75.085 1.212 0.605
After Mean 79.357 0.574 0.771
Difference 4.272*** -0.638*** 0.166***
Unsolicited members Before Mean 80.767 0.655 0.673
After Mean 87.305 0.297 1.032
Difference 6.538*** -0.358*** 0.359***
Source: All data provided by PARTS. Data are for 134 operators at PARTS during the period  January 1, 1999 to November 30, 2001.
Notes:
1. More educated members=team members with formal education beyond high school.
2. Less educated members=team members without formal education beyond high school.
3. Solicited members=employees who became team members with management soliciation.
4. Unsolicited members=employees who became team members without management soliciation.
***statistically significant at the 1% level **statistically significant at the 5% level *statistically significant at the 10% level
Table 3A The Effects on EFFICIENCY, REJECTION RATE, DOWNTIME of Team Membership:  
Fixed Effect Estimates for All Members
Dependent Variable
Independent EFFICIENCY REJECTION RATE DOWNTIME
Variable Mean of Mean of Mean of
Independent (1) (2) Independent (3) (4) Independent (5) (6)
Variable Variable Variable
MEMBERit 0.257 2.668*** 2.515*** 0.192 -0.152*** -0.142*** 0.255 0.253*** 0.236***
(6.202) (5.832) (3.160) (2.942) (13.060) (12.181)
DAYS IN TEAMit 0.785 -0.284*** -0.325*** 0.491 0.024* 0.034** 0.787 -0.016*** -0.020***
(2.631) (2.993) (1.668) (2.287) (3.332) (4.104)
Controlling for the tenure 
of the worker and its square No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 52944 52944 52944 30263 30263 30263 52657 52657 52657
Adjusted R-squared 0.348 0.348 0.106 0.107 0.250 0.252
Source: All data provided by PARTS. Data are for 134 operators at PARTS during the period  January 1, 1999 to November 30, 2001.
Notes:
1. MEMBERit is 1 if Worker i is a team member in Time t, and zero otherwise.  
2. DAYS IN TEAMit = the number of days for which Worker i has been a team member at Time t.  
3. All models include individual fixed effects and monthly time dummy variables.  Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses.       
***statistically significant at the 1% level **statistically significant at the 5% level *statistically significant at the 10% level
Table 3B The Estiamted Team Effects When Adding Those Who Quit During the Period
Fixed Effect Estimates for All Members
Dependent Variable
Independent EFFICIENCY REJECTION RATE DOWNTIME
Variable Mean of Mean of Mean of
Independent (1) Independent (3) Independent (5)
Variable Variable Variable
MEMBERit 0.175 2.608*** 0.147 -0.160*** 0.173 0.252***
(6.168) (3.110) (13.374)
DAYS IN TEAMit 0.534 -0.364*** 0.376 0.028* 0.534 -0.017***
(3.420) (1.810) (3.563)
N 77819 77819 39488 39488 77629 77629
Adjusted R-squared 0.382 0.124 0.252
Source: All data provided by PARTS. 
Data are for all operators who worked at least one day at PARTS during the period January 1, 1999 to November 30, 2001.
Notes:
1. MEMBERit is 1 if Worker i is a team member in Time t, and zero otherwise.  
2. DAYS IN TEAMit = the number of days for which Worker i has been a team member at Time t.  
3. All models include individual fixed effects and monthly time dummy variables.  Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses.       
4. No personnel records are available for those who left during the sample period.  
***statistically significant at the 1% level **statistically significant at the 5% level *statistically significant at the 10% level
Table 4A The Effects on EFFICIENCY, REJECTION RATE, DOWNTIME of Team Membership:  
Fixed Effect Estimates for Members Sought After by Management and Other Members
Dependent Variable
Independent EFFICIENCY REJECTION RATE DOWNTIME
Variable Mean of Mean of Mean of
Independent (1) (2) Independent (3) (4) Independent (5) (6)
Variable Variable Variable
SOLICITED MEMBER 0.076 2.693*** 2.685*** 0.071 -0.158** -0.155** 0.076 0.177*** 0.177***
(3.741) (3.731) (2.006) (1.962) (5.483) (5.478)
(DAYS IN TEAM)* 0.207 0.832*** 0.754*** 0.174 -0.045* -0.033 0.210 -0.028*** -0.036***
(SOLICITED MEMBER) (4.276) (3.861) (1.819) (1.335) (3.218) (4.153)
UNSOLICITED MEMBER 0.181 2.054*** 1.847*** 0.121 -0.118** -0.105* 0.179 0.305*** 0.281***
(3.947) (3.537) (2.017) (1.790) (12.998) (11.941)
(DAYS IN TEAM)* 0.577 -0.622*** -0.646*** 0.317 0.054*** 0.062*** 0.577 -0.014*** -0.016***
(UNSOLICITED MEMBER) (5.110) (5.302) (3.171) (3.623) (2.569) (2.957)
Controlling for the tenure 
of the worker and its square No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 52944 52944 52944 30263 30263 30263 52657 52657 52657
Adjusted R-squared 0.349 0.349 0.107 0.107 0.250 0.252
Source: All data provided by PARTS. Data are for 134 operators at PARTS during the period  January 1, 1999 to November 30, 2001.
Notes:
1. SOLICITED MEMBERit is 1 if Worker i is a solicited team member in Time t, and zero otherwise. (See Table 1 for the definition of solicited members)
2. UNSOLICITED MEMBERit is 1 if Worker i is a unsolicited team member in Time t, and zero otherwise. (See Table 1 for the definition of solicited members).  
3. DAYS IN TEAMit = the number of days for which Worker i has been a team member at Time t.  
4. All models include individual fixed effects and monthly time dummy variables.  Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses.       
***statistically significant at the 1% level **statistically significant at the 5% level *statistically significant at the 10% level
Table 4B Pre-Program Regressions
EFFICIENCY REJECTION RATE DOWNTIME 
Independent Variable PRIOR TO JUNE 1999 PRIOR TO JUNE 1999 PRIOR TO JUNE 1999
(1) (2) (3)
SOLICITED MEMBER -9.298*** 0.588*** -0.370***
(4.843) (3.340) (5.776)
UNSOLICITED MEMBER -12.687*** 0.036 -0.250***
(12.146) (0.475) (7.053)
TENURE 2.748*** -0.032*** 0.015***
(17.733) (3.079) (2.794)
TENURE2 -0.064*** 0.001 0.000
(17.322) (2.283) (1.231)
MORE EDUCATED 3.271*** -0.001 0.139***
(3.219) (0.011) (4.057)
MALE -8.293*** -0.351*** -0.049
(7.8570) (5.3830) (1.3850)
N 3447 2972 3522
Adjusted R-squared 0.098 0.028 0.104
Source: All data provided by PARTS. Data are for 134 operators at PARTS during the period  January 1, 1999 to November 30, 2001.
Notes:
1. SOLICITED MEMBER is 1 if Worker i eventually becomes a solicited team member, and zero otherwise. 
2. UNSOLICITED MEMBER is 1 if Worker i eventually becomes an unsolicited team member in Time t, and zero otherwise.
3. TENURE is the number of days with PARTS (in 100 days); MORE EDUCATED=1 if Worker i has formal education beyond high school, 0 otherwise; 
and MALE=1 if Worker i is male, 0 otherwise.  
4. All models include four monthly time dummy variables (February of 1999, March of 1999, April of 1999 and May of 1999; 
and January of 1999 omitted as a reference month).  
Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses.       
***statistically significant at the 1% level **statistically significant at the 5% level *statistically significant at the 10% level
Table 5 The Effects on EFFICIENCY, REJECTION RATE, DOWNTIME of Team Membership: 
Fixed Effect Estimates for Members with and without Education beyond High School
Dependent Variable
Independent EFFICIENCY REJECTION RATE DOWNTIME
Variable Mean of Mean of Mean of
Independent (1) (2) Independent (3) (4) Independent (5) (6)
Variable Variable Variable
MORE EDUCATED MEMBER 0.110 3.941*** 3.374*** 0.059 -0.694*** -0.661*** 0.109 0.211*** 0.162***
(5.164) (4.380) (6.895) (6.518) (6.273) (4.797)
(DAYS IN TEAM)* 0.356 -0.976*** -0.872*** 0.139 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.356 -0.032*** -0.022***
(MORE EDUCATED MEMBER) (5.633) (5.001) 3.622 (3.670) (4.128) (2.905)
LESS EDUCATED MEMBER 0.128 3.098*** 2.856*** 0.110 -0.048 -0.038 0.129 0.146*** 0.126***
(4.474) (4.117) (0.637) (0.503) (4.802) (4.145)
(DAYS IN TEAM)* 0.335 -1.048*** -1.125*** 0.267 -0.054** -0.046* 0.340 0.015* 0.009
(LESS EDUCATED MEMBER) (5.309) (5.687) (2.246) (1.894) 1.762 (1.050)
Controlling for the tenure 
of the worker and its square No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 39351 39351 39351 21965 21965 21965 39340 39340 39340
Adjusted R-squared 0.371 0.371 0.106 0.106 0.252 0.254
Source: All data provided by PARTS. Data are for 102 operators at PARTS during the period  January 1, 1999 to November 30, 2001.
Notes:
1. MORE EDUCATED MEMBERit is 1 if Worker i is a more educated team member in Time t, and zero otherwise. 
(See Table 1 for the definition of more educated members) 
2. LESS EDUCATED MEMBERit is 1 if Worker i is a less educated team member in Time t, and zero otherwise. 
(See Table 1 for the definition of less educated members)  
3. DAYS IN TEAMit = the number of days for which Worker i has been a team member at Time t.  
4. All models include individual fixed effects and monthly time dummy variables.  Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses.       
***statistically significant at the 1% level **statistically significant at the 5% level *statistically significant at the 10% level
Figure 1 Time Effects (EFFICIENCY) and the Number of Team Members: Jan. 1999-Nov. 2001
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Figure 2 Time Effects (REJECTION RATE) and the Number of Team Members: 
Jan. 1999-Nov. 2001 
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